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cluded. 4 The term "at your risk" although seemingly agreed to by the parties,
could not be construed to include defendant's conscious refusal to free plaintiff's property from an attachment issued against the defendant; nor was the
plaintiff estopped by his authorizing defendant to employ counsel to protect
plaintiff's interests.
The decision is sound and equitable once the court satisfied itself that a
bailment for mutual benefit was created by what ensued between the parties.
Certainly, a party may not disregard his responsibilities under a contract
founded on mutually adequate consideration and escape liability so easily.
Indeed, a bailee could not reasonably insist that, although he knew that goods
were seized under the belief that they were his, he did not have to do anything
except notify the bailor that the goods were seized under erroneous process.
The facts especially warrant the holding that a person cannot profit by his
"intentional" wrong. It was far more practical for the plaintiff to recover
damages in a suit in the United States than to interpose a claim in an Italian
court to discharge the property from attachment even though what seemingly
results is a forced sale by which the bailee was bound. The buyer still is
presumptively capable of recovering from plaintiff the full purchase price and
50% of its lost profits as part of their agreement to rescind the original sale
from plaintiff to defendant.
M. A. K.
CONSISTENT ORL CONDITION PRECEDENT TO WRITTEN MERGER AGREEMENT

UNAFFECTED BY PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

Plaintiff agreed with the defendant and others to merge a partnership
and various corporations into a single holding company, in order to attain
greater strength and more efficient operation. The written merger agreement
had as one of its terms the condition that all stock should be subscribed to
within five days and accepted within twenty-five days or the obligations of the
parties would be terminated. This condition was fulfilled, but the defendant
refused to contribute the agreed consideration on which basis the plaintiff
alleged a breach of contract and brought suit seeking specific performance and
an accounting. The defendant pleaded, as an affirmative defense, the failure
of an orally agreed upon condition precedent and offered parol evidence to
prove the plea. The oral condition pleaded was that the merger agreement was
not to become effective unless the parties were able to raise $672,500 of
so-called equity expansion funds. The trial court, admitting the evidence over
plaintiff's objection, found as a fact the failure to obtain the funds and entered
judgment dismissing the complaint. The intermediate court affirmed without
4. The Appellate Division decided that the arrangement between the parties was
to be treated differently than the usual bailment contract because the goods were actually
in the customer's possession with plaintiff-seller's knowledge and consent and subject to
plaintiff's further orders, and also because the goods were kept there "at your (plaintiff's)
risk."
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opinion. On appeal by permission, held, affirmed. Proof of an oral condition
precedent will not be refused under the parol evidence rule unless there has
been a showing that it was in fact in conflict with some term of the written
instrument. Hicks v. Bush, 10 N.Y.2d 488, 180 N.E.2d 425, 225 N.Y.S.2d 34
(1962).
The parole evidence rule, generally stated, excludes in civil actions evidence
of prior or contemporaneous negotiations that might vary, explain, or contradict the recited terms of a completely integrated document.' The rule is thought
to have had its origin in the early use of the seal, by which all above it was
deemed incontrovertible. 2 The reason for the rule as it has developed and is now
a part of modern law, is that there is an assumed intention of the parties,
evidenced by the written contract, to place themselves beyond the uncertainties
of oral testimony, and the courts are not disposed to defeat this presumed
intention of the parties. 3 The instrument itself is a better record of the agreement than the recollections of men, so much the product of subjective interpretation. The rule precludes the many problems likely to result from the
death or absence of a party, and the practical problems of perjury and fraud.
Once committed to writing let the writing speak for itself, might have been
the watchword of the many contributing formulators of the rule. It is not
difficult to perceive, however, that unqualified application of the rule might well
cause undue hardship. It is a fact of life that parties in their desire to effect
an end often agree to many things, part of which are recorded, and part of
which, for one reason or another, are not recorded. Does the rule command the
Court to ignore the facts, and hold that the parties are not entitled to what
they agreed on, but what their written instrument indicates they agreed on?
The law is not so harsh. Its development has admitted of at least two exceptionse where the admission of evidence extrinsic to the written instrument does
not do violence to the policies behind the rule. Not the least among the exceptions is that which allows for consideration of oral conditions precedent.5 A
condition precedent is not a part of a written contract,6 and indeed is not a
1. Thomas v. Scutt, 121 N.Y. 133, 27 N.E. 961 (1890); Fisch, New York Evidence
§ 41 (1959); Richardson, Evidence § 578 (8th ed. 1955); Restatement, Contracts § 237
(1932).

2. Fisch, supra note 1, at § 42.
3. Lese v. Lamprecht, 196 N.Y. 32, 89 N.E. 365 (1909); Thomas v. Scutt, supra
note 1; Richardson, supra note 1, at § 580.

4. I.e., proof of noncontractual relation for failure of consideration; fraud, duress,

mistake, and undue influence; illegality of subject matter or consideration; material

alterations, conditional delivery of contract; and incomplete writings. For a thorough

consideration of each of the foregoing, see Richardson, supra note 1, §§ 583-590.
5. Saltzman v. Barson, 239 N.Y. 332, 146 N.E. 618 (1925); Grannis v. Stevens,
216 N.Y. 583, 111 N.E. 263 (1916); Reynolds v. Robinson, 110 N.Y. 654, 18 N.E. 127
(1888); 4 Williston, Contracts § 634 (3d ed. 1961).
6. Black, Law Dictionary 366 (4th ed. 1951):
A condition precedent is one that is to be performed before the agreement becomes
effective, and which calls for the happening of some event or the performance

of some act after the terms of the contract have been agreed on, before the contract
shall be binding on the parties.
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part of a contract at all, for the parties promise only to contract "if." The "if"
is that the condition be fulfilled, and if it is not, the contract does not come
into being.
The law is now well settled in New York, that the court will receive
evidence of an oral condition precedent, if, and only if it does not conflict with
a written term of the instrument. 7 Here there is an exception to the exception,
again based on the policy behind the rule. The presumption that the parties
have freely chosen the written term from among all the alternatives carries
with it the rejection of all oral terms in conflict with those written. It may be
argued that all oral conditions precedent are contradictory and in conflict with
a written instrument by the very fact of their existence outside an instrument
which they control. But the courts require something more than this level of
conflict; they require what might be termed "real" conflict.8 There must be
actual conflict, in that the acceptance of one requires the rejection or destruction of the other. In Fadex the Court held that an oral condition precedent,
which made the existence of the contract dependent on the availability of
supplies, was in conflict with a written term affirmatively stating that they
were available. 9
The law being settled, the sole question for the Court's determination was,
whether the oral condition precedent conflicted in any way with its written
instrument. The plaintiff urged upon the Court the contention that the oral
condition was irreconcilable with the written condition that the stock all be
subscribed to within five days and accepted within twenty-five days. In short,
he argued that the one could not stand as a condition precedent, when there
was another condition precedent in the written instrument.'0 In rejecting this
argument the Court reasoned that the two conditions were not in conflict, since
each dealt with an unrelated problem. They were both conditions precedent, but
there is no prohibition against having more than one condition precedent to the
existence of a contract."' The use of two conditions precedent seems only to
forestall eventual effectiveness of the instrument until that time when both
conditions are met. Businessmen may well prefer to keep certain of their relations out of writing, as a matter of business security, expediency or perhaps
even personal privacy. The Court properly held that such a desire is not
incompatible with the policy behind the parol evidence rule, and such agreements will not be barred from the pleadings. The law remains unchanged on
this subject, the case adding only the more specific point that independent oral
and written conditions precedent do not conflict by the mere fact of their
D.R.K.
mutual existence.
7. Fadex Foreign Trading Corp. v. Crown Steel Corp., 297 N.Y. 903, 79 N.E.2d 739
(1948); see also Restatement, Contracts § 241 (1932).
8. See, e.g., Restatement, Contracts § 241, illustration (1932).
9. Fadex Foreign Trading Corp., supra note 7.
10. Hicks v. Bush at 493, 180 N.E.2d at 428, 225 N.Y.S.2d at 38.
11. See, e.g., Golden v. Meier, 129 Wis. 14, 107 N.W. 27 (1906); 3 Corbin, Contracts
541, 542 (1960).

